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NOTES
CO-OPERATIVE MARKETING-STATUTES PROVIDING PENALTY AGAINST

THIRu PERSONS" WHO INDucE BR-EACH OF MARXETfNG CONTRACTS.Capitalism is most prudent in accepting into its legal system measures
of governmental regulation which apply to economic relations generally
and contract relations particularly. Efforts of the executive, legislative or judicial branches of either British or American governments
to directly control phases of contractual relationships have generally
met staunch and rigid opposition. The spirit of the sacredness and
inviolability of the contract relation was a logical outgrowth of the
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capitalistic system in its inception. At that time freedom was a
passion, self-sufficiency a goal. From an era thus shrouded and bedecked with individualism, it is little wonder that measures affecting, even protecting, freedom of contractual relations were slow to
evolve. In 1853 in England malicious interference with a contract
by a third person was definitely recognized as a tort.1 At this time,
however, this form of judicial protection of the contract relation appeared to most businessmen in the United States as an interference
with economic freedom; yet slowly and certainly the tort of malicious
interference with contractual relations has developed in this country. 2
Once the judicial branch of the government was able to affect contracts and to protect contractual relations from malicious third-party
influence, public policy determined the boundaries of legal and illegal
interference. Thus we see privileged invasions of contractual relations
growing out of the demands of the public and national welfare. The
most outstanding examples of privileged invasions of contractual relations are the activities in the business world of the labor unions.
Likewise stemming from public policy is the privileged invasion of
contract relations by co-operative marketing associations. The government, in answer to public demands, has protected the sale of goods
under co-operative marketing agreements. Some states have made
manifest this spirit of protection by making it a misdemeanor on the
part of a third person to induce or cause the breach of a co-operative
marketing agreement. The plight of the agricultural group in the
United States during the period of rampant industrial progress gave
rise to the present interest of government in the protection of farmers.
It became increasingly apparent that a sound economy demanded a
thriving agricultural group. It was also just as apparent that positive
action was the only effective cure for the utterly dissipated farm
element.

Such governmental aid to the farmers was opposed as an infringement upon the rights of all citizens to equality under the law. Cries
of loss of freedom rose from the buyers who at the time had practically
reduced the unfortunate farmer to the position of a bargaining slave.
Fundamental rights were being violated when classes such as the
farmer were to be afforded privileges and protection. However the
concept of freedom in society and under government must inevitably
be tempered with a consideration of all other members of the society
or government. Thus the right to buy or sell at will in agricultural
circles is tempered by regulations designed to secure economic stability
1 In Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & BI. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853), defendant
was held liable by reason of his inducing an opera singer to break her contract
with the plaintiff.
2 Today the great majority of jurisdictions in the United States uphold, the
doctrine of liability on the part of a third person for maliciously interfering with
a contract between two other parties. Prosser on Torts, 978-79 (1941).
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for the farming class. 3 Numerous judicial opinions have held that
discrimination in favor of agriculture does not amount to a denial of
the equal protection of the laws to non-agricultural groups of society.
It is understood that the general welfare of these non-agricultural
groups is dependent upon the well-being of the agriculturists. 4
In the very nature of things agriculture was at the mercy of purchasers who readily ascertained the advantages of organized buying.
Combinations of purchasing capital virtually regulated the return
which farmers realized on their crops. The wretched condition of the
8 A Colorado court held certain actions of the defendant constituted criminal
inducement to breach a contract whereas other actions of the defendant against
the co-operative were not of such a nature as to fall within the purview of the
statute. In this case the court stated that it was a misdemeanor for a third person to induce a breach of a co-operative marketing agreement. Fort v. People
ex rel. Co-operative Farmers' Exchange, Inc., 81 Col. 420, 256 P. 325 (1927). In
the case of Fort et al. v. Co-operative Farmers' Exchange, Inc., 81 Col. 448, 256
P. 329 (1927) the defendant, Fort, was enjoined from inducing the members of
a marketing association to break their contracts of sale to the co-operative marketing association or from interfering in any way with the business of the co-operative. The Supreme Court of Colorado held defendant guilty of contempt of
the injunction when he continued to induce members to breach their marketing
agreements. However at this time and while this same injunction was in effect,
Fort was responsible for articles appearing in a local newspaper accusing the cooperative of "cutting" cabbage prices to the detriment of farmer members. The
Colorado Supreme Court held that these acts were not such an interference with
the business of the co-operative as to be considered unlawful. The court -armonized the constitutional right of every citizen to the liberty "to speak, write or
publish whatever he will on any subject" with the public interest of the issue
and decided that the publication would not lawfully interfere with property rights.
However in its opinion the court went on record asserting that under Colorado
statutes "knowingly to induce or to attempt to induce a member of a co-operative marketing association to break his marketing contract with the association
is a misdemeanor." Fort v. People ex rel. Co-operative Farmers' Exchange, Inc.,

supra.

4 American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S.89, 45 L. Ed. 102,
21 S.Ct. 43 (1900); Cox v. Texas, 202 U. S.446, 50 L. Ed. 1099, 26 S.Ct. 671
(1906); Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S.282, 66 L. Ed. 239,
42 S. Ct. 106 (1921) ; Rifle Potato Growers' Co-op. Assn. v. Dexter Smith, 78 Col.
171, 240 P. 937 (1925); Burley Tobacco Co. v. Gillaspy, 51 Ind. App. 593,
100 N. E. 89 (1912); Potter v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Assn., 201
Ky. 441, 257 S.W. 33 (1923); Brown v. Staple Cotton Co-op. Assn., 132 Miss.
859, 96 So. 849 (1923); State ex inf. Crow v. Continental Tobacco C., 177 Mo.
1, 755 N. W. 737 (1903); Nebraska Wheat Growers' Co-op. Assn. v. Norquest, 113
Neb. 731, 204 N. W. 798 (1925); List v. Burley Growers' Co-op. Assn., 114 Ohio
361, 151 N. E. 471 (1926); Dark Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Assn. v. Dunn, 150
Tenn. 614, 266 S.W. 308 (1924); State of Tennessee, ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Burley
Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Assn., 2 Tenn. App. 674 (1926); Northern Wisconsin
Co-op. Tobacco Pool v. Bekkedal, 182 Wis. 571, 197 N. W. 936 (1924). Other
examples of legislative discrimination in favor of agriculture are the Clayton Act;
the Capper-Volstead Act (February 18, 1922, chap. 57) 42 Stat. at L. 388, U. S. C.
title 7, sec. 291; and the Co-operative Marketing Act of July 2, 1926, chap. 725)
44 Stat. at L. 802, U. S. C. title 7, sec. 414-1.
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rural populace gained widespread recognition but its needs only increased its helplessness. Efforts to attain the farmer's obvious avenue
of escape -

that of combining with other farmers -

had not gained

widespread success. It was only through unity that the farmer would
realize equality in bargaining for the sale of his crops. But many factors hindered successful combination; farms and their occupants were
physically dispersed; the farmer was characteristically an individualistic
person and methods of combined selling had never been effectively
presented to him. Also the rest of the country was in no way prompted
to assist the farmer in his predicament because low food prices through
competitive selling were assured by the agricultural element remaining unorganized.
To relieve this unhealthy national economic situation both the state
and federal governments effected statutes providing for co-operative
marketing agreements - one phase of which is special protection in
contract relations between the co-operative and its members. The overall purpose of these statutes is usually set out in the introduction to
the co-operative marketing act of each jurisdiction. 5
It is well settled that the very existence of the co-operative depends upon the enforcement of its mutual contracts of purchase and
resale - exclusive purchase from the members and exclusive resale
to the buyer through the co-operative. If this "exclusiveness" in cooperative activity were not insisted upon, the effectiveness of the organization would be seriously hampered if not totally destroyed. There
would be no easier method of destroying the co-operative than to interfere with the exclusiveness of flow of products from the member
producer through the co-operative to the final purchaser. The cpoperative can only insure a just return to the farmer for his products
when it is the exclusive or, at least, the predominating bargaining
5 Indiana Statutes Annotated (Burns, 1933) § 15-1601, "Declaration of Policy.
(a) In order to promote, foster and encourage the intelligent and orderly production and marketing of agricultural products through cooperation; and to elimimate speculation and waste; and to make the distribution of agricultural products
between producer and consumer as direct as can be efficiently done; to stabilize
the marketing of agricultural products, and to provide for the organization and
incorporation of agricultural cooperative associations and societies, this act is
passed.
(b) It is here recognized that agriculture is characterized by individual production in contrast to the group or factory system that characterized other forms
of industrial production, and that the ordinary form of corporate organization
permits industrial groups to combine for the purpose of group production and the
ensuing group marketing and that the public has an interest in permitting
farmers to bring their industry to the high degree of efficiency and merchandising skill evidenced in the marketing industries; and that the public interest demands that the farmer be encouraged to attain a superior and more direct system
of marketing in the substitution of merchandising for the blind, unscientific and
speculative selling of crops. (Acts 1925, ch. 20, sec. I p. 42; 1931, ch. 34, sec.
1, p. 79)."
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agent in the area for the products. Extensive competition would
cause the complete dissolution of the co-operative and a return to the
former open market competition where a single farmer sold to the organized purchaser. For this reason co-operative marketing statutes
have provided penalties for members who breach their co-operative
marketing agreements. But more important are the stringent penalties
which are provided for those third persons who induce the member to
breach his co-operative marketing contract. Recognizing the serious
danger of possible destruction of the co-operative by third party interference in the co-operative marketing contract, legislatures have, in
some cases, made it a misdemeanor on the part of the third person
who induces the member to breach his marketing contract. 6 Many
other states provide for heavy penalties to be assessed in a civil suit
in favor of the co-operative against the third persons who bring about
7
a breach of marketing agreement.
The basic defense of a third person guilty of inducing a breach of
a co-operative marketing contract has been the plea of the unconstitutionality of the statute which classifies such a breach as blameworthy.
It is claimed that a statute condemning a third person for buying products impairs the freedom of contractual relations. Also equal protection under the law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution is pointed to as being violated by such penalty statutes.
This same Constitutional Amendment affords to those guilty of inducing a breach the possible argument that the statute takes property
from them without due process of law. Overshadowing all these defenses is the plea that the legislature has no power to make the influencing of a member to breach a co-operative marketing contract a
crime.
6 The following states have statutes which render a third person guilty of a
misdemeanor if he knowingly induces a member to breach a co-operative marketing agreement; Colorado, Minnesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and
Vermont. A typical co-operative marketing agreement penalty statute is that of
Kentucky which also makes it a crime to induce a member to breach his marketing contract. Kentucky Statutes Annotated (Baldwin, 1943) § 272.990 "Penalties:
(2) Any individual or any corporation whose officers or employees knowingly
induce or attempt to induce any member to break his marketing contract with
an association or who maliciously and knowingly spreads false reports about the
finances or management of any association shall be fined not less then one hundred
dollars nor more than one thousand dollars for each offense, and shall be -liable
to the association aggrieved in a civil suit in the penal sum of five hundred dollars,
for each offense."
7 The following states have statutes which provide for the recovery of a
penalty in favor of the co-operative from a third person who induces a member
to breach his co-operative marketing contract. These states do not make this
action a misdemeanor, however. They are: California, Florida, Georgia, Ilindis,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland; Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska,

New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Tennessee and Virginia. Texas provides for treble damages to go to the co-operative.
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These contentions are rebutted in the majority of the courts by
reference to the police power of the legislature to secure the general
welfare of the community. The courts point out the dilemma in which
the farm element existed prior to governmental aid. The legislative
intent obviously was to remove the obstacles which stood in the path
of clarification of this agricultural dilemma. It has been shown that
penalty statutes prohibiting third persons from inducing members to
breach their co-operative marketing contracts are essential to the
potency of the acts as corrective measures. Thus the co-operative
marketing acts are established as necessary tools to the maintenance
of the general welfare, and the penalty statutes are considered as
essential to the effective existence of the acts.
In an outstanding federal case involving this controversy the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the constitutionality of a
typical marketing agreement penalty statute by a unanimous decision
in 1928.8 The defendant warehouse company purchased tobacco from
a producer, who, as a member of the plaintiff co-operative, had pledged
the sale of his full crop to the co-operative. The warehouse, at the
time of the purchase, was fully aware of the producer's co-operative
marketing agreement with the plaintiff. Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the undivided court in finding the warehouse
guilty of inducing a breach of a co-operative marketing contract.
The defendants challenged the validity of the criminal penalty
statute as offending the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
and thus depriving them of equal protection of the laws. The court
rebutted this contention by stating:
"The statute penalizes all who wittingly solicit, persuade, or
induce an association member to break his marketing contract. It
8 Liberty Warehouse Company v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-operative
Marketing Association, 276 U. S. 71, 72 L. Ed. 473, 48 S. Ct. 291 (1928). Tigner
v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141, 84 L. Ed. 1124, 60 S. Ct. 881 (1940) pointed out that
the principal case was an outstanding example of the attitude of the judiciary
toward the legislative policy of aid to agriculture. In further support of the
principal case is In re Wisconsin Co-operative Milk Pool, 35 F. S. 787 (1940) in
which the court held that co-operative associations for the marketing of agricultural
products have a favored status under federal laws and the laws of Wisconsin, and
that, therefore, a co-operative thus organized was not to be amenable to adjudication as an involuntary bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Act. Compare with
Shuster et al. v. Ohio Farmers' Co-operative Milk Association, 61 F. (2d) 339
(1932) which affirmed the validity of the Liberty Warehouse case but found cooperative marketing associations amenable to the Bankruptcy Act. The court
stated that the Liberty Warehouse case served to illuminate brilliantly the active
existence of co-operative marketing in economic fields and that with their existence thus apparent to Congress, it was the place of the legislative body to
specifically exclude the co-operatives from the Bankruptcy Act. For a discussion
of the principal case see (1929) Tenn. L. Rev. 7:123-7F and (1929) Texas L.
Rev. 7:306-7F. Also the same problem is discussed in Note (1928) Harvard L
Rev. 41:668-9.
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does not prescribe more rigorous penalties for warehousemen than
for other offenders. Nobody is permitted to do what is denied to
warehousemen. There is no substantial basis upon which to invoke the equal protection clause." (Italics ours)
The defendants placed much reliance on the Connolly case of 1902,
in which the United States Supreme Court decided that particular exemption of argricultural interests was a denial of the equal protection
of the law. The Connolly case had little value in the solution of the
present case, the Court held, as it distinguished the Connolly case from
the instant proceedings on factual grounds.9
The Supreme Court concluded its statement in support of validity
of the statute by expressing the now generally accepted policy regarding co-operative marketing statutes:
"Co-operative marketing statutes promote the common interest.
The provisions for protecting the fundamental contracts against
interference by outsiders are essential to the plan. This court
has recognized as permissible some discrimination intended to encourage agriculture. And in many cases it has affirmed the general
power of the states so to legislate as to meet a definitely threatened
evil. Viewing all the circumstances, it is impossible for us to say
that the legislature of Kentucky could not treat marketing contracts between association and its members as of a separate class,
provide against probable interference therewith, and to that extent limit the sometime action of warehousemen.
"The liberty of contract guaranteed by the Constitution is freedom from arbitrary restraint - not immunity from reasonable
regulationto safeguard the public interest. The question is whether
the restrictions of a statute have reasonable relation to a proper
purpose." 10 (Italics ours)
9 Later, also the case of Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540, 46
L. Ed. 679, 22 S. Ct. 431 (1902) was overruled in Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S.
141, 84 L. Ed. 1124, 60 S. Ct. 881 (1940) cited supra note 8. There Mr. Justice
Frankfurter delivered the eight to one majority opinion and in part stated: "And
so we conclude that to write into law the differences between agriculture and other
economic pursuits was within the power of the Texas legislature. Connolly's case
has been worn away by the erosion of time, and we are of opinion that it is no
longer controlling." The Court pointed out that an impressive legislative movement during the forty years following the Connolly case was witness to the general
acceptance of the view that the differences between agriculture and industry call
for differentiation in the formulation of public policy.
10 The view of the principial case finds virtually universal judicial support.
Warren v. Alabama Farm Bureau Cotton Assn., 213 Ala. 61, 104 So. 264 (1925),
where the court was of the opinion that co-operatives were in no way injurious
to the public interest or in any way violative of public policy. In Arkansas Cotton Growers' Co-op. Assn. v. Brown, 128 Ark. 504, 270 S. W. 946, 1119 (1925)
the court sustained a Co-operative Marketing Act: "The statute seems to be in a
form which has become standard and has been enacted in many of the states, the

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Kentucky was one of the earliest states whose supreme court was
called upon to uphold the constitutionality of a co-operative marketing statute which made it a misdemeanor to induce a member to breach
a marketing contract. In 1910 the court decided that, unless such a
statute were expressly or impliedly forbidden by the terms of the
state or federal constitutions, it is valid. Since co-operative marketing pools are lawful, the passage of statutes necessary for the protection of those pools is within the police power of the legislature, the
court said. Likewise co-operative marketing penalty statutes are not
an interference with one's right to acquire property because a person
has no right to acquire property from those who have no right to sell
that property. The Kentucky Supreme Court also announced that
the legislature, for purposes of public welfare, may set out the farm
element as a group to be protected, and that as long as all persons
who violate the terms of a protection statute are guilty, there is no
denial of equal protection of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 1
enactment of such legislation being manifestly prompted by the universal urge to
promote prosperity in agricultural pursuits." The court in Manchester Dairy
System v. Hayward, 82 N. H. 193, 132 Atl. 12 (1926) held a co-operative
marketing contract in accord with public policy. "Co-operative marketing agreements, containing the essential features of the contract here considered, have
been recognized in many of our states as a legitimate means of protecting its
members against oppression, of avoiding the waste incident to the dumping of
produce upon the market with the consequent wide fluctuations in prices and of
securing to the producer a larger share of the price paid by the consumer for his
products." In accord are Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Assn. v. Jones, 185 N. C. 265,
117 S. E. 174 (1923); Northern Wisconsin Co-op. Tobacco Pool v. Bekkedal, 182
Wis. 571, 197 N. W. 936 (1924); Dark Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Amsn. v. Dunn,
150 Tenn. 614, 266 S. W. 308 (1924); Tobacco Growers' Co-operative Assn. v.
Danville Warehouse Co., Inc., 144 Va. 456, 132 S. E. 482 (1926); Burley Tobacco
Society v. Gillaspy, 51 Ind. App. 583, 100 N. E., 89 (1912); Bullville Milk Producers' Assn., Inc. v. Armstrong, 178 N. Y. S. 612 (1919); Anaheim Citrus Fruit
Assn. v. Yoeman, 51 Cal. App. 759, 197 P. 959 (1921); Washington Cranberry
Growers' Assn. v. Moore, 117 Wash. 430, 201 P. 773, 204 P. 811 (1922). Contra,
Minnesota Wheat Growers' Co-op. Marketing Assn. v. Rahke, 163 Minn. 403, 204
N. W. 314 (1925), where the court held that a statute prohibiting third parties
from buying or handling products merely because they were under contract to be
sold to a co-operative marketing association is an infringement of the liberty of
contract guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions. This court held the
statute to be unconstitutional. This view apparently stands alone in American
judicial decisions.
11 Commonwealth v. Hodges et al., 137 Ky. 233, 125 S. W. 689 (1910).
Other decisions which recognize the principal case as valid authority are: Burley
Tobacco Society v. Gillaspy, 51 Ind. App. 583, 100 N. E. 89 (1912); Louisville
& N. R. Co. v. Burley Tobacco Society et al., 147 Ky. 22, 143 S. W. 1040 (1912);
Liberty Warehouse Company v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-operative Marketing Association, 276 U. S. 71, 72 L. Ed. 473, 48 S. Ct. 291 (1928); Potter v. Dark
Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Assn., 201 Ky. 441, 257 S. W. 33 (1923); Lee et al. v.
Clearwater Growers Assn. et al., 93 Fla. 214, 111 So. 722 (1927); Tobacco Growers'
Co-op. Assn. v. Jones, 185 N. C. 265, 117 S. E. 174 (1923) and Elephant Butte
Alfalfa Assn. v. Rouault, 33 N. M. 136, 262 P. 185 (1928).
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Co-operative marketing statutes have been enacted in virtually every
state of the Union, and an examination of the cases shows that universal judicial acceptance has greeted legislative efforts to aid the
12
plight of the farmer by these co-operative marketing agreements.
Likewise virtually universal judicial acceptance has greeted those
penalty statutes which safeguard the existence of co-operative marketing contracts. The strongest of these penalty statutes are those which
make it a misdemeanor for a third person to induce a breach of such a
contract. These are forcefully indicative of the genuine wholehearted
assistance government is bringing to argricultural groups in this
country.
A most controversial economic question of the present day - how
much personal freedom must be forfeited to the government to establish an economic system which affords security to all - finds one
answer in the principles of co-operative organizations.
In a democratic system 6f government where the majority of the
citizens exercise control of the policies of the government, it is inevitable that this majority be constantly pressing for governmental
reforms aimed at the minority which possesses the means of production.
Thus we see economists offering solutions to the problem of economic
security for the political majority.
Since the collectivist state, placing the means of production in the
hands of the government, is comparatively easy to attain, this method
of attaining majority economic security seems to receive the most active and effective support.
However it has been said that a form of economy based on the principle of the co-operative organization also would bring economic security
to the majority of the citizens. This system is known as the distributive state wherein the mass of citizens own the means of production.
Such a system, however, is not so easily attained. It places on each
citizen the burden of control and decision in relation to his private
property - his share in the means of production. Property, of course,
is private and for this reason alone many advocates have been found
to support the distributive modification of capitalistic government. For
this reason, also, an expanding future has been predicted for the cooperative marketing association.
Thomas Broden.

12 Liberty Warehouse Company v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-operative
Marketing Association, 276 U. S. 71, 72 L. Ed. 473, 48 S. Ct. 291 (1928).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EVOLUTION OF CONGRESSIONAL TAXING
POWERS INCMENT TO CHILD LABOR REFOnRS.-A system of economic

and social regulation by various governmental agencies has become as
commonplce in our daily lives as putting on our shoes in the morning.
We are becoming accustomed to the striking reform measures instituted
under economic stress in the early thirties of the Roosevelt Era, and
carried through -the forties to expedite the war program. Many of
these reforms, regulatory in nature, are based on the powers of Congress
under the Constitution to tax, to regulate commerce, and to establish
and operate the post offices and post roads. Each of these presents a
vast source of material for review, but the discussion here will be restricted to a brief consideration of the regulatory taxing power and
will deal more specifically with the Child Labor Tax Case, its history,
applications to later legislation, and prospective results in the present
period of social reform.
From earliest colonial times, to the present day, our individualism
has rebelled against strict regulation, and this attitude is closely related to our concept of a free pursuit of happiness. It was firmly imprinted in the minds of our patriot forefathers by the heavy hand of
the Royal Tax Collector, who taxed the trade of the colonies to suit
the needs of Parliament and the British merchant class. It is, therefore, significant that the first Congressional power mentioned in our
Federal Constitution refers to taxation and its limitations.'
An early outgrowth of the bitter struggle between a strong centralized government and state superiority was climaxed in the now legendary decision of McCullock v. Maryland,2 which, in a sense, was a bit
of historical irony in that it was a state's attempt to impose a regulatory
and prohibitive tax on a federally instituted National Bank. Chief
Justice Marshall made a bold stand against state superiority in writing for a unanimous Court that "the power to tax involves the power
to destroy," and that "the power to destroy may defeat and render
useless the power to create." Following this line of reasoning the
Maryland law was declared unconstitutional without testing the question as to whether it was really a revenue measure or not.
In 1869 the Supreme Court decided the case of Veazie Bank v.
Fenno,3 in which it passed upon the power of Congress to levy an excessive tax on state bank notes. By an act Congress raised a tax on
the circulating notes of persons and state banks from one per cent to

I U. S. CONST. Art I, § 8: "The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States."
2 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819); accord, U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358,
2 L. Ed. 304 (1804); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L.
Ed. 204 (1824).
3

8 Wall. 533, 19 L. Ed. 482 (1869).
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a prohibitive ten per cent, thus giving the national currency virtual

ironclad protection.

Chief Justice Chase, former Secretary of the

Treasury during Lincoln's first administration, had advocated at that
time a plan for a uniform currency of national bank notes. Chase, in

speaking for the majority of the Court, said:
"Having thus, in the exercise of undisputed constitutional
powers, undertaken to provide a currency for the whole country,
it cannot be questioned that Congress may, constitutionally, secure
the benefit of it to the people by appropriate legislation... Without this power, indeed, its attempts to secure a sound and uniform
currency for the country must be futile."
The Court warned that the judicial branch could not prescribe limitations upon acknowledged powers of the legislative department, even
though such taxes might be oppressive upon a class of persons. The
relief sought should come through the medium of the ballot on election day.
At the beginning of the twentieth century the dairy interests felt
the need of protection from a highly competitive oleomargarine industry. By an act of Congress, which the dairymen instituted, a prohibitory tax of ten cents a pound was placed on all colored oleomargarine. The statute was designed ostensibly to raise revenue, but by
restricting competition it defeated this purpose by eliminating any and
all revenue. The act could not be justified as a health measure, as
later acts were, because oleomargarine is not an unhealthful product.
Once again in a case paralleling the Veazie Bank case the Supreme
Court upheld the taxing measure, as an exercise by Congress of its
constitutional power which, although oppressive to one group, could
4
not be limited by judicial review.
The Supreme Court wisely upheld taxing measures regulating the
sale- of narcotics over which the individual states were unable to exercise proper control. By a five to four decision, the Harrison Narcotic
Drug Act was sustained 5 even though it was known that its aim was
regulative and lacked the purpose of revenue through taxation. Justice
Day, speaking for the majority, clearly stated that the Court would
not inquire into the motives that might impel the use of the taxing
power. The fact that similar regulatory legislation might be passed
under the police power in the various states did not invalidate the taxing power of Congress in this situation.
If closely examined, many tax measures have underlying motives
other than raising revenue, and exercise some regulating or equalizing
function relating to social welfare. Our graduated income and inheritance taxes, while just, in many respects are an outgrowth of the
McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 49 L. Ed. 79 (1904).
5 United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S.86, 63 L. Ed. 493 (1919).
4
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desire of our people to bring about a greater measure of equality of
wealth. The upholding of excise taxes placed on some commodities,
and not on others, show that a consideration of social values has been
taken into account by the courts. But the Supreme Court was presently to state, in the grain-futures and child labor cases, that a worthy
social objective would not of itself validate an act.
The Child Labor Tax Case 6 had an interesting history and sheds
light on the social reform movement which paralleled the years of
World War I. Cheap labor meant, as it always does, a lower standard
of living, and the reformers of the late nineteenth century found receptive minds eager to carry out their ideas. Women were beginning to
demand an equal position in life, not only for themselves but for their
children. Educational standards were developing more and more each
year. The sweat shop conditions in the factories across the country
were exposed, and this turned the people's attention toward more adequate child labor legislation that might eventually allow all children
educational and recreational benefits. Competing industrialists were
confronted by changes in economic as well as social standards. Many
of the northern states, in spite of opposition by employers, had adopted
varying forms of legislation limiting child labor, while the southern
industrial operators, unaffected by such restrictions, were producing
goods equal in quality at lower wage scales. The northern employers
had visions of declining markets for their goods under this unbalanced
competition from the South. To remedy this situation, they urged
their Congressmen to find some means by which this labor competition
could be equalized. In other words, to indirectly impose uniform child
labor legislation on all employers. The southerners countered this attack with the "states rights" theory as protection for their industries.
Congress decided that it might use its commerce power to impose
uniform restrictions on the states, but shortly after the act by which
it attempted to do this became effective, a case testing its constitutionality was brought to the Supreme Court.7 By a five to four decision the act was declared unconstitutional. 8 The Court reasoned
that the subjects of previous regulatory legislation, passed under the
commerce power - lottery tickets, "white slavery," narcotics, and impure food, all considered immoral or harmful - differed in nature from
goods manufactured by children.
While the Court was being criticized from all quarters for its decision, Congress was busy searching for another power upon which
child labor regulation might be constitutionally upheld. Congress also
hoped that the public indignation might stir the thinking of the judges,
6
7

Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20, 66 L. Ed. 817 (1922).
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 62 L. Ed. 1101 (1918).

8 See Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S.
251, 277, 62 L. Ed. 1101, 1108 (1918).
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so that at least one would change his opinion if another similar test
case should come before the court. It was decided that by the use of
a prohibitive tax, as a revenue measure, sufficient validity would be
given new legislationP Briefly, the tax decided upon imposed an excise
of ten per cent of the entire net profits earned during the year by factories or other establishments for knowingly employing any child under
sixteen in a mine or quarry, or under fourteen in a mill, workshop,
cannery or factory, or allowing children between the ages of fourteen
and sixteen to work longer than eight hours a day during a six day
week, or allowing them to work after seven o'clock in the evening or
before six o'clock in the morning. In 1922 this revenue act came before the Court to be tested. 10 Chief Justice Taft wrote the opinion in
this case, and clearly pointed out that it was not within the authority
of Congress to pass by its tax powers an act that, for similar reasons
had been rejected under the commerce power. The tax subterfuge was
so excessive that it was clearly a penalty, and the amount was not
proportioned to the number of violations. Knowledge of an unlawful violation is associated with a penalty, but a tax should not discriminate as this one did. Since the states have the power under the
Tenth Amendment to regulate their own child labor as they desire,
the act was declared unconstitutional. Chief Justice Taft sounded this
warning which might be remembered in judging all regulatory legislation:
"Grant the validity of this law, and all that Congress would
need to do hereafter, in seeking to take over to its control any one
of the great number of subjects of public interest, jurisdiction of
which the states have never parted with, and which is reserved to
them by the Tenth Amendment, would be to enact a detailed
measure to complete regulation of the subject and enforce it by a
so-called tax upon departures from it. To give such magic to the
word 'tax' would be to break down all constitutional limitation of
the powers of Congress and completely wipe out the sovereignty
of the states." "
The only course that now seemed open to Congress was the passage
of a Child Labor Amendment. On June 2, 1924 this Amendment was
proposed to the legislatures of the several states for their ratification
or rejection. Public opinion which had formerly been in accord with
Congress, voiced its dissatisfaction almost immediately, when it was
found to what extent this innocent appearing Amendment could be
interpreted. It reads as follows:
9 Revenue Act of 1918 §1200-1208; 40 STAT. 1138, Chap. 18 Comp. Stat. §
63367Aa (1919).
10

Bailey'v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20, 66 L. Ed. 817 (1922).

11 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 269 U. S. 20, 38, 66 L. Ed. 817, 820 (1922).
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Section 1. The Congress shall have power to limit, regulate,
and prohibit the labor of persons under eighteen years of age.
Section 2. The power of the several states is unimpaired by
this article except that the operation of state laws shall be suspended to the extent necessary to give effect to legislation enacted
by the Congress.
Not one of the individual states had gone as far as Congress now desired to go in controlling the labor of persons under eighteen years
of age. Many men saw the eventual dissolution of the sovereign
state's rights in this proposal, and were determined not to allow such
a menace to infiltrate into the Constitution under the guise of social
betterment for our children. In his Farewell Address, Washington
warned us that we should "resist the spirit of innovation upon its
principles, however specious the pretexts" and that alterations might
"impair the energy of the system and thus undermine what cannot be
directly overthrown." 12
Upon examination, it is seen that the Amendment does not only
refer to regulating child labor, but abolishes it entirely, a far greater
step than was attempted by previous acts under Congressional commerce and taxing powers. The framers were advised against using the
term "child" which usually means a person under fourteen years of
age, so "persons" was substituted to accompany the eighteen-year age
limit. The term "labor" was substituted for the phrase "employed or
permitted to work" which had been used in previous child labor
statutes. By the use of such a term many types of work, outside employment for wages, could be included. The labor of the farmers'
children would become unlawful and a mother would be breaking the
law by telling her daughter to help wash the dishes or make the beds.
It was pointed out that many families were dependent on the earning
power of children whose maturity and strength at sixteen and seventeen was equal to their parents. Many, at these ages, became dissatisfied with the requirements of schools, and were eager to start
earning and learning their future occupation or trade. It was also
shown that by acts pursuant to Section 2 of the proposed Amendment,
an unlimited army of federal investigators would result and be responsible only to the Secretary of Labor. Congress could thus directly
or indirectly affect the lives of nearly two-fifths of our population. 13
With these objections to retard its ratification the Child Labor
Amendment seemed destined to remain before the state legislatures as
a dead issue doomed to ultimate failure. During the decade that fol12 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 403, 4 L. Ed. 579, 601 (1819);
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 275, 62 L. Ed. 1101, 1107 (1918); Bailey
v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20, 37, 66 L. Ed. 817, 819 (1922).

13 Warren, The Proposed Child Labor Amendment; Its Implications and

Consequences. 11 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1924).
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lowed, the states passed child labor measures of their own, suitable to
their individual needs. Mining state laws might be more restrictive
than neighboring agricultural state laws, and in between lay the mill,
factory, and canning states, but each law was more effective than a
general prohibitive federal amendment.
In 1933, a new administration came into power to try to revive a
depression-sick nation. As the "New Deal" progressed, a change of
sentiment resurrected the almost forgotten Child Labor Amendment.
When employment was at a low point, everyone advocated any measure
to spread the work among men who had families to support. The curtailing of child labor was one of these. The National Industrial Recovery Act, an emergency measure, banned employment of children
under sixteen years of age. Many of the states which had rejected
the Child Labor Amendment in previous years, changed their ideas
as to the so-called "evil and socialistic features," and looked to it as
a means of returning the country to the prosperous "twenties." The
American Bar Association opposed this sudden shift in popularity, advocating instead a uniform child labor act which had been drafted by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 14
Although the original Amendment had no time limit within which it
had to be ratified, many felt that it should be regarded as impotent
and without effect, because of its slow progress toward ratification.
Seven years had been the usual limit regarded by Congress as reason.
able, and Justice Van Devanter speaking for a unanimous Court in
1921, voiced a similar contention.1 5 By 1936, twenty-five of the
necessary thirty-six states had ratified the proposal, an increase of
nineteen since its revival. Inspired by another sweeping victory in the
November, 1936, election, President Roosevelt wrote a letter to the
Governors of the nineteen states that had not ratified the Amendment,
pointing out the increase of child labor in sub-standard work, and
asked that they make ratification one of the important measures at
the next meeting of their legislatures. Only three states added their
strength to the others, and opposition to the Amendment seemed to
have stemmed the tide of its popularity. The legality of many of the
individual state ratifications was challenged before the Supreme Court
because previously the Amendment had been rejected by them. The
Court refused to decide the question stating that it was entirely political in nature.' 6
To appease the dissatisfied opposition, another Amendment was
favorably reported to the Senate, 17 eliminating many of the unpopular
'4 Special Committee of the American Bar Association, The Federal Child
Labor Amendment, 21 A. B. A. J. 11 (1935).
15 Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U. S. 368, 374, 65 L.Ed. 994, 996 (1921).
16 Coleman v. Mfiller, 307 U. S. 433, 83 L. Ed. 1385 (1939).
17 Senate Report No. 788, 75th Cong., 1st sess.
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defects of the 1924 Amendment; it never, however, replaced the 1924
Amendment in the state legislatures. Finally, it was decided by the
administration, that the latter Amendment should be allowed to
die a natural death, and the problem would be solved through other
channels. An all-inclusive Fair Labor Standards Act 18 was proposed
by the President and passed by Congress in 1938 under the commerce
power. It cured many of the ills that had plagued the working man
in general, and prohibited interstate commerce by those industries
which indulged in oppressive child labor practices.
President Roosevelt's many opportunities to nominate justices to
the Supreme Court during his administration made it likely that the
Court would sustain legislation that was passed by the pro-Roosevelt
Congresses. The occasion arose in 1941, when the Court was called
upon to test the constitutionality of the interstate commerce provisions
of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 19 Justice Stone in delivering the
opinion of the Court stated:
"The conclusion is inescapable that Hammer v. Dagenhart was
a departure from the principles which have prevailed in the interpretatioA of the commerce clause both before and since the decision and that such vitality, as a precedent, as it then had has
long since been exhausted. It should be and now is overruled."
Thus the Court dismissed by decision a controversy that had lasted for
twenty-two years. The long debated need for a Child Labor Amendment had been circumvented without the fears of its opponents being
realized. What might have been the consequences, had either the
original Child Labor Cases, or the proposed Amendment been sustained
by the Court at earlier hearings, is conjecture now', but the long effort
served the purpose of educating the people and bringing about the enactment of acceptable legislation in this field of child welfare.
As has been shown by these varying attempts to enact child labor
legislation, historical progress, from early concepts of "states rights"
to federal exercise of governmental functions, has been the trend, as
ideas and popular needs change with the growth and development of
our nation.
Richard H. Keen.
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52 STAT., 1060, 29 U. S. C. A., § § 201-219 (Supp. 1938).
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United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 85 L. Ed. 395 (1941).
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IMPLIED ASSIGNMENTS OF PATENTS RESULTING FRom EMPLOYEREMPLOYEE RELATIOiSHIP.-AS a prerequisite to employment, many

corporations require that in the case of employees whose work is of
such a nature that patentable inventions are likely to be conceived
or developed by the employee during his period of employment, such
employees shall sign an agreement assigning all the patent rights of
the invention to the employer. However, where this practice is not
followed a conflict often arises as to the respective rights of the employer and employee to the invention. As was stated by a Wisconsin
court, "The mere fact that in making an invention, an employee uses
the materials of his employer, and is aided by the services and suggestions of his co-employees and his employer in perfecting and bringing
the same into successful use is insufficient to preclude him from all
rights thereto as an inventor." 1
In making clear the distinction between the circumstances necessary
to give the employer the right to compel an assignment and those requisite to entitle him to shop rights only, a court held:
"Where there is no employment to invent and no agreement to
assign, the employer's interests are fully protected by the privileges
and benefits of shop rights. There are two items of property involved, that of the employer who owns the product in its improved
form, and that of the inventor, to whom the novel idea belongs.
These property rights remain distinct from each other unless and
until the inventor has agreed to assign his idea to his employer.
If the idea has become embodied in the' product of the employer,
and in a sense mingled with it because the materials of the employer and the services of his workman have been used in reducing
it to practical form, the employer has a right to manufacture the
improved product without paying royalties to the inventor." 2
The earlier cases in this country laid down the rule that the employer was not entitled to an assignment of patent rights in the absence
of an express agreement to assign. 8 In 1882 the Supreme Court ruled:
"But a manufacturing corporation, which has employed a skilled workman, for a stated compensation to take charge of its works, and to
devote his time and services to devising and making improvements in
articles there manufactured, is not entitled to a conveyance of patents obtained for inventions made by him while so employed, in the
absence of express agreement to that effect." 4 (Italics ours)
Fuller and Johnson Mfg. Co. v. Bartlett, 68 Wis. 73, 31 N. W. 747 (1k887).
Barlow and Seelig Mfg. Co. v. Patch, 232 Wis. 220, 286 N. W. 577 (1940).
8 Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U. S. 226, 7 S. Ct. 193, 30 L. Ed. 369 (1886);
McWilliams Mfg. Co. v. Blundell, 11 F. 419 (1882); Pressed Steel Car Co. v.
Hansen, 137 F. 403, 17 C. C. A. 207 (1905); American Stoker v. Underfeed Stoker,
182 F. 642, 110 C. C. A. 292 (1910); Johnson Furnace Co. v. Western Furnace
Co., 178 F. 819, 102 C. C. A. 267 (1910).
4 Dazell v. Dubilier Mfg. Co., 149 U. S. 315, 13 S. Ct. 886, 37 L. Ed. 749
1
2

(1893).
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However, today the trend of the decisions appears to be in favor of
the employer rather than the employee in that specific agreements to
assign are no longer necessary in all cases in order to give the employer the"entire interest on any invention developed by the employee
during his term of employment. In 1924 in the frequently quoted
case of Standard Parts v. Peck 5 the Supreme Court abandoned the requirement that an express contract or agreement was essential and held
that an agreement to assign might be implied from the terms of the
employment or from other circumstances. In this case the defendant
Peck had been employed to "devote his time to the development of a
process and machinery" and received a stated compensation. He was
ordered by the court to assign all his rights to the plaintiff, his employer.
The types of employment under which the invention may have
arisen may be divided into two general classes:
1. General employment in which the employee made the invention outside the usual scope of his duties, but on his employer's time and with the aid of his employer's equipment
and materials.
2. Employment in which the inventor has been hired for the
specific purpose of working on the problem out of which the
invention arose or was later assigned to the problem by his
employer.
The general rule is that inventions arising under Class I type of
employment belong to the inventor, with the employer merely retaining shop rights to the invention. The rule still stands which was laid
down by the Supreme Court in 1890 in which the court held: "An
employee performing all the duties assigned to him in his department
of service, may exercise his inventive faculties in any direction he
chooses with the assurance that whatever invention he may thus conceive and perfect is his individual property." 6 In a case which is a
typical example of this type of employment, the facts as stated by the
court were as follows:
"Carey, the inventor, was a draughtsman employed by the Ingle
Machine Company at a salary of $35 a week. His work consisted in
making drawings for machines built by that company. He was not
employed to design any particular machine, or to use his inventive
faculties in any way. He was under no contract to assign to his employer any inventions he might make. During his term of employment
he did, in fact, make the invention subsequently embodied in the patent
in suit." 7
5 Standard Parts v. Peck, 264 U. S. 52, 44 S. Ct. 239, 68 L. Ed. 560 (1924).

6 Solomons v. United States, 137 U. S. 342, 11 S. Ct. 88, 34 L. Ed. 667 (1890).
7 Ingle v. Landis Tool Co., 272 F. 464, cert. den. 257 U. S. 644, 42 S. Ct.
54, 66 L. Ed. 413 (1921).
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In cases such as this where the initial employment is for routine
work the burden is on the employer to show that the employment was
later changed to inventive work. 8
When the invention has been conceived by the employee who has
been employed under circumstances similar to those described in Class
2 type of employment, then it is usually held that there has been an
implied assignment of the patent rights to the employer. The Peck
case cited above is an example of this class of employment. In cases
of this nature the problem often arises as to whether the invention
was within or outside the scope of the duties of the employee. This
problem was discussed in a federal court in which the judge pointed
out:
"The all important question is Dowse's relation to the tire manufacturing business. If he was only a hired man, taking orders as
to his work from another officer or employee, the invention belonged to him, leaving only an implied license or shop right of the
corporation, and this right was only personal to it, incapable of
being assigned.
"It then becomes necessary to examine Dowse's relation to the
corporation. He did not expressly contract as a part of his duties
to design new tires; but if he did so agree in substance, and was
more than a mere employee, having the main responsibility to
make the business successful, then he should be compelled to assign the patent." 9
It has been held to be immaterial whether the employee has been
hired to devote part of his time to the problem out of which the invention arose, or whether he is putting all his time on the problem. In
either case the employer has a right to the entire title to the improvements or patents resulting.10 Nor is it material whether the inventor
was originally hired to work on the project out of which the invention arose or was assigned to it later. In this respect a court held:
"We can see no distinction between a case where one is originally employed for the limited purpose of solving a specific mechanical problem
and another case where he is employed generally to concern himself
with such problems and during the course of the employment and
within the scope thereof, is assigned to a specific one." "I Another
court supported this view in stating: "It matters not in what capacity
the employee may originally have been hired, if he be set to experimenting with the view of making an invention, and accepts pay for
such work, it is his duty to disclose to his employer what he discovers
8 Barlow and Seelig Mfg. Co. v. Patch, 232 Wis. 220, 286 N. W. 577 (1940).
9 Dowse v. Federal Rubber Co., 254 F. 308 (1910).
10 Magnetic Mfg. Co. v. Dings Magnetic Separator Co., 16 F. (2d) 739,
cert. den. 274 U. S. 740, 47 S. Ct. 586, 71 L. Ed. 1320 (1927).
11 Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Miller, 22 F. (2d) 353 (1927).

